Abstract. At Crypto'90, Koyama and Terada proposed a family of cryptographic functions for application to symmetric block ciphers. Youssef and Tavares showed that this family is a ne and hence it is completely insecure. In response to this, Koyama and Terada modi ed their design, by including a data dependent operation between layers. The modi ed family of circuits was presented in the rst international security workshop (ISW'97). In this paper, we show that the modi ed circuit can be easily broken by a di erential-like attack. More explicitly, we show that after d rounds, and for any speci c key k, the input X can be partitioned into M 2 d sets such that the ciphertext Y of each set is related to the plaintext X by an a ne relation. In the average case, M << 2 d . Our attack enables us to explicitly recover these linear relations. We were able to break an 8?round 64?bit version of this family in few minutes on a workstation using less than 2 20 chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
1 Introduction and de nitions Koyama and Terada 2] proposed a family of cryptographic functions called \non-linear" parity circuits. Youssef and Tavares 4] showed that this family of functions is a ne over GF (2) and hence it is completely insecure. In 3], Koyama and Terada introduced a random involution called Value-DependentSwapping (VDS). In the VDS, the left half and the right half of a sequence of bits are swapped if its parity is odd. By including this VDS in the parity circuits proposed in 2], Koyama 
where h(x) 2 0; 1.
De nition2. Let x = LjjR be a sequence of 2k, k > 0 bits where L stands for left half of x and R stands for right, length(L) = length(R) = k. A VDS, which is an involution value-dependent-swapping based on the parity of the weight of x, is de ned to be V (x) = RjjL if weight(x) is odd; LjjR if weight(x) is even;
where weight(x) is the number of 1's in the bit sequence x.
De nition3. A parity layer with length n, or simply an L(n) circuit layer, is a Boolean device with an n-bit input and n-bit output, characterized by a key that is a sequence of n symbols from 0; 1; +; ?.
De nition4. A function B = f(K; A) computed by an L(n) circuit layer with key K = k 1 k 2 k n 2 f0; 1; +; ?g n is the relation from an n-bit input sequence A = a 1 a 2 a n 2 0; 1 n to an n-bit sequence B = b 1 b 2 b n 2 f0; 1g n de ned
below. An L(n) circuit layer computes rst the variable T modulo 2 such that A F + function from f0; 1g n to f0; 1g n computed by a circuit C(n; d) with key = KjjK 2 K d as
(7) Table 1 shows the example given in 3] for a C + (n; d) circuit with n = 10 and d = 3 Table 1 . C+(n; d) with n = 10 and d = 3 2 Cryptanalysis of the C + (n; d) circuit
Since the C(n; d) circuit is a ne 4], the C + (n; d) circuit can be viewed as a composition of key-dependent a ne transformations and the VDS layer (see Figure 2 ). Thus the security of the C + (n; d) relies heavily on the cryptographic strength of the VDS layer. In our attack, we pick random triples R 1 ; R 2 and R 3 and test for the condition in equation (10). Since there is no guarantee that R 3 will belong to S i even if R 1
and R 2 do, we repeat the test for di erent values of R 3 (Threshold 1 in Figure  2 ). We decide that R 1 and R 2 are in the same set if the condition is satis ed for a large number of times (Threshold 2 in Figure 2 ). Wrong decisions by the algorithm (i.e., if the algorithm declares that R 2 and R 1 are in the same set while they are not) can be ltered out by collecting more than n + 1 pairs (e.g., P = 2n pairs) because with high probability the resulting set of equations we will try to solve will be inconsistent if the algorithm accepts wrong pairs. Another method to prevent the algorithm from accepting wrong pairs is to increase the value of Threshold 1 and make the value of Threshold 2 very close to Threshold 1 . However, this may increase the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required to break the algorithm. Assuming that the size of the input sets are equal, then the probability that R 1 ; R 2 and R 3 are in the same set is 1 M 3 where M is the number of partitions.
The maximum value for M is max(2 d ; 2 n ). Thus the number of chosen plaintextciphertext pairs required for the attack increases with M 3 . In other words, the success of the attack depends heavily on the number of the input partitions. The average number of partitions for n = 10 is shown in Table 3 . Each point represents an average over 100 C + (n; d) with randomly selected keys. It is clear that this number is much less than the optimum value max(2 d ; 2 n ). Our experimental results shows that this large deviation from the optimum case holds for larger block lengths. Note that because we don't know M in advance, it is hard to optimize the choice of Threshold 1 and Threshold 2 to minimize the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs required for the attack. Moreover, our experements shows that the C + (n; d) circuit fails to behave like a random function for practical values of d and hence it is not easy to predicit the probabilty of wrong pairs satisfying equation (10) based on the random function model. The good point (from the attacker point of view) is that the attack works almost all the time.
In many cases, we were able to break an 8?round 64?bit version of this family in few minutes on a workstation using less than 2 20 chosen plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Throughout these experements, the value of Threshold 2 was set based on the statistics of the pass variable (see Figure 2 ). We set Threshold 2 close to the maximum value of pass. Table 2 . Average number of sets versus optimal value for n = 10 4 Conclusion
The security of the C + (n; d) circuit relies only on the cryptographic strength of the VDS function because the rest of the circuit is a ne. Controlling the swapping based on the parity results in a cryptographically weak function. Thus for practical values of n and d, the augmented family of parity circuits C + (n; d) proposed by Koyama and Terada is insecure. 
